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LIMITED RIGHTS AS PARTIAL VETO AND SEN’S IMPOSSIBILITY
THEOREM
MAURICE SALLES
Abstract. In 1970 Amartya Sen introduced within social choice theory the notion
of minimal liberty and proved an impossibility result concerning social decision func-
tions. In this paper, Sen’s condition of (minimal) liberty is weakened. It is then shown
that the same kind of impossibility obtains for social welfare functions and for func-
tions whose values are interval orders or semiorders. Comparisons between Arrovian
impossibility theorems and Sen-type impossibility theorems are made.
1. introduction
The origin of the tremendous development of studies on rights and freedom within so-
cial choice theory and normative economics can be traced back to the famous short paper
of Amartya Sen published in 1970 (Sen (1970); see also his book published the same year
(1970a)). In this paper, it is shown in the framework of aggregation procedures that there
is a conﬂict between collective rationality (in terms of properties of choice functions or
in terms of a transitivity-type of the social preference property—in fact, acyclicity of the
asymmetric part of the social preference), Paretianism (a unanimity property) and some
slight violation of neutrality (neutrality meaning that the names of options or social states
are not to be taken into account) possibly combined with some slightly unequal distribu-
tion of power among individuals interpreted as an individual liberty property. Although,
since then, rights have been considered within another paradigm, viz. game forms (see
for instance G¨ ardenfors (1981, 2005), Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura (1992), Peleg
(1997, 1998) and Suzumura (2006)), and freedom has been mainly analyzed in the context
of opportunity sets following the pioneering paper of Pattanaik and Xu (1990) (see also the
survey by Barbera, Bossert and Pattanaik (2004)), some authors (for instance Saari and
P´ etron (2006) and Igersheim (2006)) have recently revisited the foundational framework of
Sen and Gibbard (1974) either by studying the informational structure of the aggregation
procedure or by examining the consequences of taking a Cartesian structure to deﬁne the
set of social states, consequences that take the form of a restriction of individual prefer-
ences. The purpose of this paper is diﬀerent. I wish to formally study a weakening of the
conditions associated with the notion of individual liberty. I have always considered that
this condition was rather strong in Sen’s original paper. In fact, the condition is quite
strong in the mathematical framework and only the interpretation, to my view, makes it
not only acceptable but obvious. In his comments to a paper by Brunel (now P´ etron) and
Salles (1998), Hammond (1998) writes:
In the social choice rule approach ..., local dictatorship becomes a desideratum, provided that
the ‘localities’ are appropriate. Our feelings of revulsion should be reserved for non-local dicta-
torships, or local dictatorships aﬀecting issues that should not be treated as personal.
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I entirely share this opinion, but there is nothing in the basic mathematical framework that
guarantees this personal aspect (in contrast with a suitable Cartesian product structure).
In this basic framework, it is however possible to weaken local dictatorships. Unfortunately
I will show that this weakening does not oﬀer a very interesting escape route from Sen’s
negative result. From a formal point of view, I believe that there is a sort of analogy that
can be made between a family of Sen’s impossibility theorems and Arrovian impossibility
theorems.
After introducing general deﬁnitions and recalling Sen’s theorems, I will present new
Sen-type impossibility theorems, then will make a comparison with Arrovian impossibility
theorems, commenting on similarities and obvious diﬀerences.
2. Basic definitions and Sen’s theorem
X will be the set of social states. Nothing speciﬁc is assumed for this set. A binary
relation, a preference, over X is a subset of X × X. It will be denoted by . I will write
x  y rather than (x,y) ∈. All binary relations considered in this chapter are supposed
to be complete (for all x and y ∈ X, x  y or y  x) and, consequently, reﬂexive (for all
x ∈ X, x  x). The asymmetric part of , denoted  is deﬁned (since  is complete)
by x  y if ¬y  x. The symmetric part of  is deﬁned by x ∼ y if x  y and y  x.
Intuitively, x  y will mean ‘x is at least as good as y’, x  y will mean ‘x is preferred
to y’ and x ∼ y will mean ‘there is an indiﬀerence between x and y’.  is transitive if for
all x, y and z ∈ X, x  y and y  z ⇒ x  z.  is transitive if for all x, y and z ∈ X,
x  y and y  z ⇒ x  z. ∼ is transitive if for all x, y and z ∈ X, x ∼ y and y ∼ z ⇒
x ∼ z. If x  is transitive,  and ∼ are transitive too.  is said to be  quasi-transitive if 
is transitive (then ∼ is not necessarily transitive).  is acyclic if there is no ﬁnite subset
of X, {x1,...,xk} for which x1  x2, x2  x3, ..., xk−1  xk and xk  x1. A complete
and transitive binary relation is a complete preorder (sometimes called ‘weak ordering’). B
will denote the set of complete binary relations over X, P will denote the set of complete
preorders over X, Q will denote the set of complete and quasi-transitive binary relations
over X, and A will denote the set of complete binary relations over X whose asymmetric
part is acyclic.
N will denote the set of individuals. Nothing speciﬁc will be assumed for this set unless
it is clearly indicated that it is ﬁnite. Individual i ∈ N has her preference given by a
complete preorder i over X. A proﬁle π is a function from N to P0, π : i 7→i, where
P0 ⊆ P with P0 6= ∅ . Π0 is the set of proﬁles when the i’s are in P0 and Π is the set
of all proﬁles (when the i’s are in P). When N is ﬁnite and #X = n, a proﬁle is an
n-list (1,...,n) with each i in P0. Then Π0 = P0n and Π = Pn (P0n and Pn are n-times
Cartesian products of P0 and P).
Deﬁnition 1. An aggregation function is a function f : Π0 → B.
An aggregation function associates a unique complete binary relation, a social prefer-
ence, denoted by S to individual preferences (one preference for each individual).
Given an aggregation function f, and two (distinct) social states x and y ∈ X,1 we will
say that individual i ∈ N is (x,y)-decisive if for all π ∈ Π0, x i y ⇒ x S y, where S is
the asymmetric part of S= f(π).
1They have to be distinct so that saying it superﬂuous since we consider that x i y and i is
asymmetric.3
Deﬁnition 2. An individual who is (x,y)-decisive and (y,x)-decisive will be said to be
{x,y}-decisive or a {x,y}-dictator.
I can now deﬁne Sen’s two liberalism conditions. Let f be an aggregation function.
Deﬁnition 3. (Liberalism, general 2-D+) For all i ∈ N, there exist ai and bi ∈ X such
that i is a {ai,bi}-dictator.
It should be noticed that P0 must be large enough to have a non trivial satisfaction of
general 2-D+: for each individual i it must be possible to have both ai i bi and bi i ai.
Also, it should be outlined that the condition is rather fair since each individual is endowed
with the same kind of power. The theorem can be proved by using a weaker form of the
foregoing condition.
Deﬁnition 4. (Minimal liberalism, minimal 2-D+) There exist two individuals i and
j ∈ N, and a, b, c, d ∈ X such that i is a {a,b}-dictator and j is a {c,d}-dictator.
Of course, the fairness property disappeared. The options are to be ‘interpreted’ as
being speciﬁc to the concerned individual, i.e., a and b are speciﬁc to individual i; a and b
can even be ‘interpreted’ as perfectly identical social states except for some features that
are personal to individual i. Clearly general 2-D+ implies minimal 2-D+.
As previously mentioned, the domain of the aggregation function f must be rich enough.
This will be taken care of (with some excess) by the following condition U.
Deﬁnition 5. (Universality, U) Let f be an aggregation function. Universality requires
that P0 = P.
This means that an individual preference can be any complete preorder. There is no
restriction imposed by some kind of upper rationality or the existence of inter-individual
constraints. The last condition (condition P) is a weak form of unanimity (Pareto princi-
ple).
Deﬁnition 6. (Pareto principle, P) Let f be an aggregation function, π ∈ Π0 and x,
y ∈ X. 2 If for all i ∈ N, x i y, then x S y where S is the asymmetric part of
S= f(π).
Sen’s theorem is obtained within a large class of aggregation functions (Sen called them
social decision functions).
Deﬁnition 7. A A-valued aggregation function (or social decision function) is a function
f : Π0 → A.
The collective rationality imposed in this case is rather weak. It has an interesting
consequence on the non-emptiness of the set of maximal elements in any ﬁnite subset of X
(or since we are considering complete binary relations on the non-emptiness of maximum
elements or choices).
Theorem 1. If there are at least two individuals and if #X ≥ 2, there is no A-valued
aggregation function satisfying minimal 2-D+, U and P.
2Again, x and y are necessarily distinct.4 MAURICE SALLES
An immediate corollary is:
Corollary 1. If there are at least two individuals and if #X ≥ 2, there is no A-valued
aggregation function satisfying general 2-D+, U and P.
3. Partial veto and Sen-type theorems
It is in reading Pattanaik’s paper (Pattanaik (1996)) that I got the impetus to work on
this topic. In particular in this paper, Pattanaik discusses Sen’s possible views regarding
a distinction between a conception of rights as the ability to prevent something and a
conception of rights as the obligation to prevent something which seems to be endowed
in the liberalism conditions. Although I wished to devote some time to introduce modal
theoretic techniques to deal with this distinction, I will be in this chapter more modest
and will consider a weakening of the liberalism conditions. It is however obvious that this
weakening is not a real response to the ability-obligation problem. Nevertheless, at least
from a semantical point of view, having a (partial) veto corresponds rather well to the
idea of an ability to prevent something. I will then introduce the notion of partial veto
and will show how robust Sen’s theorem is.
Given an aggregation function f, and two (distinct) social states x and y ∈ X, we will
say that individual i ∈ N is (x,y)-semi-decisive if for all π ∈ Π0, x i y ⇒ x S y, where
S= f(π).
Deﬁnition 8. An individual who is (x,y)-semi-decisive and (y,x)-semi-decisive will be
said to be {x,y}-semi-decisive or a {x,y}-vetoer.
As can be seen, the diﬀerence between a {x,y}-vetoer and a {x,y}-dictator is the diﬀer-
ence between x S y and x S y. A {x,y}-vetoer’s power amounts to the assurance that
y will not be ‘ranked’ before x in the social preference.3 I can now deﬁne weak versions of
liberalism.
Deﬁnition 9. (Weak liberalism, general 2-V+) For all i ∈ N, there exist ai and bi ∈ X
such that i is a {ai,bi}-vetoer.
Deﬁnition 10. (Minimal weak liberalism, minimal 2-V+). There exist two individuals i
and j ∈ N, and a, b, c, d ∈ X such that i is a {a,b}-vetoer and j is a {c,d}-vetoer.
One of the possible Pareto extension functions (based on the weak form of the Pareto
principle of condition P) that will be discussed later, indicates that having weak liberalism
will not make S non quasi-transitive. Consequently problems can be met only for the
transitivity of social preference, or, as will be seen, for binary relations which are, in some
sense, between preorders and quasi-transitive binary relations. We will deﬁne two of these
‘intermediate’ relations, interval orders and semiorders. These deﬁnitions can be stated as
properties of the asymmetric part of the complete binary relation  over X.
Deﬁnition 11.  on X is an interval order if for all w, x, y, and z ∈ X, w  y and x  z
⇒ w  z or x  y.
The set of interval orders over X with be denoted by I
3I use quotation marks for ‘ranked’ since a ranking can only be meaningful for X being ﬁnite with a
(some) social state(s) ranked ﬁrst etc.5
Deﬁnition 12.  on X is a semiorder if it is an interval order and if for all w, x, y, and
z ∈ X, w  x and x  y ⇒ w  z or z  y.
The set of semiorders will be denoted by S. These two concepts have mainly been in-
troduced in measurement theory to deal with possible intransitive indiﬀerence. Although
indiﬀerence is not necessarily transitive contrary to what is the case with preorders, it
should be noted that, for both concepts,  is transitive (see Fishburn (1985) and Suppes
& al. (1989)).
My ﬁrst result is for social welfare functions.
Deﬁnition 13. A P-valued aggregation function (or social welfare function) is a function
f : Π0 → P.
Theorem 2. If there are at least two individuals, there is no P-valued aggregation function
satisfying U, P and minimal 2-V+, provided that {a,b} 6= {c,d}.
Proof. Let f be an aggregation function. i is a {a,b}-vetoer and j is a {c,d}-vetoer.
{a,b} 6= {c,d}. Note that #X ≥ 3. Let us assume ﬁrst that {a,b} ∩ {c,d} 6= ∅. Without
loss of generality, assume that b = c. Let π be a proﬁle such that a i b, b j d, and for
all k ∈ N, d k a. Then we have for i, d i a i b and for j, b j d j a. Since i is a
{a,b}-vetoer, we have a S b, and since j is a {b,d}-vetoer, we have b S d. If f were
P-valued, by transitivity, we should have a S d, but by condition P, we have d S a, a
contradiction.
Consider now the case where {a,b} ∩ {c,d} = ∅. Let π be a proﬁle such that a i b,
c j d and for all k ∈ N, b k c and d k a. Then, we have d i a i b i c and
b j c j d j a. By condition P, we have b S c and d S a. Since j is a {c,d}-vetoer,
we have c S d. If f were P-valued, b S c and c S d and d S a would imply b S a.
But a S b since i is a {a,b}-vetoer, a contradiction.
Although one can obtain a cycle with two options (a S b and b S a), three options
are necessary for an intransitivity. Now, I will consider the case of interval orders.
Theorem 3. If there are at least two individuals, there is no I-valued aggregation function
satisfying U, P and minimal 2-V+, provided that {a,b} ∩ {c,d} 6= ∅.
Proof. Let f be an aggregation function. Obviously, #X ≥ 4. Let π be a proﬁle such
that a i b, c j d, and for all k ∈ N, b k c and d k a. Observe that d i a i b i c
and b j c j d j a. Since b S c and d S a by condition P, we should have if S
were an interval order, i.e., if f were I-valued, b S a or d S c. But we have (a S b and
c S d) since i is a {a,b}-vetoer and j is a {c,d}-vetoer, a conjunction that is the negation
of the disjunction (b S a or d S c) (given completeness of S).
If #X = 3, the condition given in deﬁnition 11 is reduced to the transitivity of S.
Then, the Pareto extension function based on the weak form of the Pareto principle given
in condition P is a counter-example. Let me deﬁne this Pareto extension function.
Deﬁnition 14. Let π ∈ Π0 and x, y ∈ X. f is the weak Pareto extension function if
x S y ⇔ ∀k ∈ N x k y, and y S x otherwise.
One can easily see that S is transitive and that each individual i is a {x,y}-vetoer for
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Semiorders are ‘between’ preorders and interval orders. Can we expect to have some
progress? In fact, one obtains, as could be expected, a theorem ‘between’ Theorem 2 and
Theorem 3, although the reﬁnement is quite modest.
Theorem 4. If there are at least two individuals, there is no S-valued aggregation function
satisfying U, P and minimal 2-V+, provided that {a,b} 6= {c,d} and #X ≥ 4.
Proof. Let f be an aggregation function. Suppose ﬁrst that {a,b} 6= {c,d}, but {a,b}∩
{c,d} 6= ∅. Without loss of generality, assume that a = d. Consider a proﬁle π such that
a i b, c j a, and for all k ∈ N, b k e and e k c, where e is a fourth social state. Note
that a i b i e i c and b j e j c j a. Then, by condition P, b S e and e S c. If
S were a semiorder, i.e., if f were S-valued, we should have (b S a or a S c). But we
have (a S b and c S a), since i is a {a,b}-vetoer and j is a {a,c}-vetoer, a conjunction
that is the negation of the disjunction (b S a or a S c), a contradiction.
If {a,b} ∩ {c,d} = ∅, the proof is of course similar to the proof of Theorem 3.
Theorems 2-4 have obvious corollaries (omitted) when minimal weak liberalism is re-
placed by weak liberalism.
This hierarchy of results is reminiscent of the family of Arrovian impossibility theorems.
In the next section, I will present a parallel between these two families of impossibility
results.
4. Comparing Sen-type impossibilities with Arrovian impossibilities
I will very brieﬂy state Arrovian theorems with their necessary supplementary deﬁni-
tions. For all these theorems N is supposed to be ﬁnite with #N = n. In all the deﬁnitions
of this section, we suppose that f is an aggregation function.
Deﬁnition 15. (Independence–binary form, I) Let π and π0 ∈ Π0 with π : i 7→i and
π0 : i 7→0
i. Consider any x, y ∈ X. If i |{x,y} =0
i |{x,y} for all i ∈ N, then S=0
S
where S= f(π) and 0
S= f(π0).
(S |{x,y} is the restriction of S to {x,y}.)
Deﬁnition 16. A dictator is an individual who is a {x,y}-dictator for all {x,y} ⊆ X.
Deﬁnition 17. (Condition D−, non-dictatorship) There is no dictator.
Theorem 5. (Arrow (1950, 1951, 1963) If n ≥ 2 and #X ≥ 3, there is no P-valued
aggregation function (social welfare function) satisfying U, P, I and D−.
The Pareto extension function is a counter-example to a theorem which would be similar
to Arrow’s theorem except that P-valuedness would be replaced by Q-valuedness. How-
ever, if non-dictatorship is replaced by a no-vetoer condition, the result is restaured.
Deﬁnition 18. A vetoer is an individual who is a {x,y}-vetoer for all {x,y} ⊆ X.
Deﬁnition 19. (Condition V−, no-vetoer) There is no vetoer.7
Theorem 6. (Gibbard (1969)) If n ≥ 2 and #X ≥ 3, there is no Q-valued aggregation
function satisfying U, P, I and V−.
There is more in the original Gibbard’s paper, since Gibbard shows that if f is a
Q-valued aggregation function satisfying U, P, I, there exists an oligarchy, a group of in-
dividuals having full power if they act unanimously and whose members are all vetoers.
For n = 2, majority rule gives a quasi-transitive social preference, but, in this case, each
of the two individuals is a vetoer.
If one considers A-valued aggregation function (social decision function), one can still
get an impossibility provided that the aggregation function is increasing (this property is
often called strict monotonicity or positive responsiveness).
Deﬁnition 20. (Increasing aggregation function, IF) f is an increasing aggregation func-
tion if for all π, π0 ∈ Π0, and all x, y ∈ X, if for all i ∈ N, (x i y ⇒ x 0
i y and
x ∼i y ⇒ x 0
i y), and there exists j ∈ N such that (y j x and x 0
j y) or (x ∼j y
and x 0
j y), then x S y ⇒ x 0
S y, where S= f(π) and 0
S is the asymmetric part of
0
S= f(π0).
Intuitively this condition means that if option x does not decrease vis-` a-vis option y in
all individual preferences, and if x increases vis-` a-vis y in at least one individual prefer-
ence, then, this increase must be reﬂected at the social level, when possible.
Theorem 7. (Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein (1972)) If n ≥ 4 and #X ≥ 3, there is no
A-valued aggregation function (social decision function) satisfying U, P, I, V− and IF.
A rather conﬁdential result oﬀers a reﬁnement of this theorem.
Deﬁnition 21. A quasi-dictator is an individual i who is a vetoer such that for all π ∈ Π0,
and all x, y ∈ X, x i y and x ∼S y ⇒ for all j 6= i, y j x, where ∼S is the symmetric
part of S= f(π).
A quasi-dictator is then nearly exactly similar to the Arrovian dictator except in the
case where all other individuals have a strict preference that is the inverse of his strict
preference.4
Deﬁnition 22. (Condition Q-D−, non-quasi-dictatorship) There is no quasi-dictator.
Theorem 8. (Bordes and Salles (1978)) If n ≥ 4 and #X ≥ 3, there is no A-valued
aggregation function (social decision function) satisfying U, P, I, Q-D− and IF.
Surprisingly, Arrovian theorems regarding semiorder-valued (or interval order-valued)
aggregation functions appeared later. It was, however, quite important to know that
Arrow’s theorem could be obtained without postulating that the social preference be a
complete preorder. These important and somewhat neglected results are due to Blau
(1979) and Blair and Pollak (1979) (in fact their papers appeared in the same issue of the
Journal of Economic Theory).
Theorem 9. (Blau, Blair and Pollak) If n ≥ 4 and #X ≥ 4, there is no S-valued aggre-
gation function (social decision function) or no I-valued aggregation function satisfying U,
4I prefer to use ‘his’ rather than ‘her’ for this sort of people! I hope that this is not politically incorrect.8 MAURICE SALLES
P, I and D−.
To the best of my knowledge and contrary to the case of Sen-type impossibility the-
orems, there is no way to make a distinction between S-valued and I-valued aggregation
function. Of course, for three options, the properties of interval orders and of semiorders
are both reduced to quasi-transitivity and then the Pareto extension function gives an
appropriate counter-example.
The following table provides a useful summary of the preceding results and establishes
a sort of parallel.
Table 1. Comparing Arrovian and Sen-type impossibility theorems
IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREMS
Aggregation Function Arrovian (with U+I+P) Sen-Type (with U+P)
P-valued D− minimal 2-V+
S-valued D− minimal 2-V+
I-valued D− minimal 2-V+
Q-valued V− minimal 2-D+
A-valued (V− or Q-D−)+IF minimal 2-D+
What this table shows is the connection between D− and 2-V+, and between V− and 2-
D+. However, as shown in the next section, this parallel should not be taken too seriously.
5. Discussion
In this section, I will outline the major diﬀerences between the two categories of impos-
sibility theorems. The ﬁrst one concerns the set of individuals N. As I mentioned at the
beginning of the preceding section, for Arrovian impossibility theorems we assume that
N is ﬁnite. From a historical point of view, after the publication of Arrow’s papers and
book, a question was whether this assumption was only there to make the proof of the
theorem easier (and, after all, N ﬁnite is a rather easily justiﬁable property) or whether
this was a necessity. Fishburn (1970) was the ﬁrst to show that it was a necessary assump-
tion. With N inﬁnite, Fishburn provided a counter-example. Incidentally, Fishburn’s short
paper was the starting point of an active research with possibly metaphysical implications.
As clearly stated in the table, independence (of irrelevant alternatives—diﬀerent from
the Chernoﬀ variety) is a very important feature of Arrovian theorems. This property is
not used at all in Sen-type theorems.
Both categories of impossibility theorems are stated with condition U. It is, however,
possible to deﬁne smaller domains so that we could obtain impossibilities (see Kalai and
Muller (1977) for Arrovian social welfare functions). For Sen-type theorems, one only need
a domain rich enough to include the proﬁles leading to the impossibilities.
Sen’s theorem is often considered with social choice functions rather than A-valued
functions (social decision functions). A social choice function is a function f? : 2X −∅×Π0
such that for all S ∈ 2X − ∅ and all π ∈ Π0, f?(S,π) ⊆ S. This function selects social
states in each non-empty subset of the set of social states. To deﬁne liberalism, one can
say that for all i ∈ N, there exist two social states {ai,bi} such that for all non-empty
S ⊆ X and all π ∈ Π0, if ai ∈ S and ai i bi, then bi / ∈ f?(S,π) and if bi ∈ S and bi i ai,
then ai / ∈ f?(S,π). A similar deﬁnition can be given for minimal liberalism by restricting
the deﬁnition to only two individuals in a way similar to what was done previously. Using
this framework, the proof of the corresponding theorem consists in emptying f?(S,π) for9
speciﬁc S and π. This proof is as easy as the proof for A-valued functions, and it is not sur-
prising given the strong relations between -cycles and the absence of maximal elements
(or between acyclicity and the existence of maximal elements, as previously mentioned).
Things are less simple with weak liberalism. With liberalism, if ai i bi, then bi is rejected
from all choice sets f?(S,π) such that ai ∈ S. This means that f?({ai,bi},π) = {ai}. This
corresponds intuitively well to ai S bi. Weak liberalism only tells us that ai S bi. In-
tuitively but also in the standard choice literature, this corresponds to ai ∈ f?({ai,bi},π).
This means that ai must be selected but it does not say that bi is rejected, and, further-
more, we cannot say anything about the selection from the other sets to which ai belongs.
Of course this diﬃculty can be probably taken care of by imposing to f? properties bor-
rowed from the revealed preference and rationalizability literature (this will be the subject
of another paper).
Finally and this is the main diﬀerence, diﬀerence which is at the origin of recent major
developments on non-welfaristic issues in normative economics, Sen-type theorems are
non-welfaristic.5 The word welfarism is associated with the idea that the goodness of
social states are evaluated only on the basis of individual utilities attached to these social
states. This leads to the following observation. If we have four social states w, x, y and z
and if each individual i attributes the same utility to w and to x, and the same utility to
y and to z, then, the social ranking of w and y must be the same as the social ranking of
x and z. This can lead to various properties of neutrality for functions deﬁned on proﬁles
of utility functions and this can be extended to proﬁles of individual preferences in which
case one obtains intra or inter proﬁles neutrality (for an introduction to the non-welfaristic
literature, I recommend the remarkable article by Pattanaik published in a too conﬁdential
book, see Pattanaik (1994)). Intuitively, neutrality means that names of social states do
not matter. The liberalism conditions obviously violate neutrality since speciﬁc social
states are attached to speciﬁc individuals.
6. Conclusion
In this chapter, Sen’s liberalism conditions have been weakened. Partial dictatorship
has been replaced by partial veto. This weakening could be justiﬁed to some extent by
a wish to consider rights as the ability to prevent something to happen rather than the
obligation to prevent something to happen. Unfortunately, this weakening does not take
us very far since impossibilities will occur if we replace social decision functions by social
welfare functions or other aggregation functions ‘between’ social welfare functions and
social decision functions. Considering a kind of hierarchy of aggregation functions on the
basis of the collective rationality of the associated social preference, it was natural to
compare Sen-type impossibility theorems with Arrovian impossibility theorems. Although
this comparison shows that there is some interesting relations from a mathematical point
of view, the discrepancies are probably more important from an interpretative point of
view. In particular, the discrepancy between welfaristic aspects of the Arrovian theorems
and the non-welfaristic aspects of Sen-type theorems is a very important one that has
been outlined. Sen’s theorem has been justly considered as the foundational result of
non-welfaristic normative economics. In forthcoming papers I will consider the extension
of the results of the present paper to a choice-theoretic framework. I will also come back
to the debate between ability (possibility) and obligation by using modal logic.
7. Appendix
Blau (1979) and to some extent Blair and Pollak (and probably others) deﬁne interval
orders and semiorders diﬀerently from Deﬁnition 11 and 12. Given that S is complete, the
following propositions show the equivalence between the deﬁnitions of the present chapter
5The following remarks owe much to Kotaro Suzumura. I am very grateful to him for calling my
attention to this crucial aspect10 MAURICE SALLES
which are borrowed from Fishburn (1985) and Suppes and al. (1989) and the deﬁnitions
used by Blau (these results are probably already known, but I have been unable to ﬁnd
where it could be).
Proposition 1. Let  be complete. Then the following two statements are equivalent.
(i) for all w, x, y, and z ∈ X, w  y and x  z ⇒ w  z or x  y.
(ii) for all w, x, y, and z ∈ X, w  x and x ∼ y and y  z → w  z.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Suppose (i) and w  x and x ∼ y and y  z. Since w  x and y  z,
then by (i), w  z or y  x. But ¬y  x since x ∼ y, and then w  z.
(ii) ⇒ (i). Suppose (ii) but not (i). Then there exist a, b, c and d ∈ X such that a  c
and b  d and ¬(a  d or b  c). But ¬(a  d or b  c) is equivalent to (d  a and c  b)
since  is complete. c  b is either c  b or c ∼ b. If c  b, a  c and c  b and b  d
imply a  d since  is transitive by (ii) (take x = y and note that ∼ is reﬂexive). This
contradicts d  a. If c ∼ b, a  c and c ∼ b and b  d imply a  d by (ii), contradicting
d  a again.
The next result concerns Deﬁnition 12.
Proposition 2. Let  be complete. Then the following two statements are equivalent.
(i) For all w, x, y, and z ∈ X, w  x and x  y ⇒ w  z or z  y.
(ii) For all w, x, y, and z ∈ X, w  x and x  y and y ∼ z ⇒ w  z.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Suppose we have (i) and that w  x and x  y and y ∼ z. But w  x
and x  y imply by (i) (w  z or z  y). Since y ∼ z, then ¬z  y, and w  z.
(ii) ⇒ (i). Suppose we have (ii) and not (i). Then there exist a, b, c and d ∈ X such that
a  b and b  c and ¬(a  d or d  c), i.e., (d  a and c  d) by completeness of . If
c  d, a  b and b  c and c  d imply a  d since  is transitive by (ii) (take y = z and
note that ∼ is reﬂexive). But this contradicts d  a. If c ∼ d, a  b and b  c and c ∼ d
imply a  d by (ii), which contradicts d  a.
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